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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUSTIN F. WINCHESTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EGAN FARM SERVICE, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Defendant deems it advisable and desirable to 
supplement the Statement of Facts as set forth in Plain-
tiff's brief. To the extent that it is repetitious of 
plaintiff's statement, it is to the end of coordinating the 
facts. 
Plaintiff commenced its action against Long Manu-
facturing Company and Dearborn Motors Corporation,· 
as well as the defendant. Long Manufacturing Company 
and its successor, Dearborn Motors, was alleged by 
plaintiff as being the manufacturer of the baler. De-
fendant Egan was alleged to have "assembled or at-
tached the part of the baler which caused the injury". 
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The complaint further alleged that plaintiff was struck 
in the face "by a lever, which, without fault of the plain-
tiff, broke loose from its mounting". __ The complaint 
then alleged : 
"4. Said lever and mounting was negligently 
and carelessly attached to the aforesaid baler, 
was negligently, poorly and improperly engi-
neered and constructed, and contained attachment 
parts which were weak, defective and insufficient 
in size and strength, all to the degree that the 
same was unsafe and constituted a menace to 
human life and limb. Defendants knew, or should 
have known, that the same was dangerous and 
defective for the purpose of its intended use." 
Service of process was attempted to be made on 
the defendants, Long Manufacturing Company and 
Dearborn :Motors, but such service was quashed on 
motion of such defendants. Plaintiff elected to ·proceed 
against the defendant Egan, which was neither the 
engineer, designer nor manufacturer, and who was in 
no wise responsible for the design or construction of 
the baler, nor any of its component parts, including the 
lever assembly. 
Plaintiff called as his first witness .A. Merlin Egan, 
President and Manager of the defendant company. He 
testified that he received the baler in question from his 
distributor. That when so received the lever proper was 
not attached to the ba~er, but that the attaching parts, 
namely, the bolt, nut, washer and spacer, were attached. 
Thus, in attaching the lever, all he had to do was to 
remove the nut and washer from the bolt (which was 
already in the frame) slip the lever on, replace the 
washer and tighten the nut. He used no parts of his 
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own, and all parts to be used came attached to the frame 
(T1·. 14-21). lie further testified that the machine as 
so assembled was delivered to plaintiff a few days prior 
to Septmnbo1· 18, 1931, and that plaintiff, after trying 
the machine out for a few days, bought it on September 
18, 1951. 
We here interject to recall to the Court that the 
contention of plaintiff is that the defendant, Egan Farm 
Service, Inc., negligently and improperly attached the 
lever assembly by (1) using an undersized bolt, and, 
(2) completely omitting the sleeve or spacer. Neither 
of these contentions were proven by the testimony of 
Mr. Egan, but on the contrary his testimony established-
(1) that he used the parts furnished by the manufact-
urer, and none other, and (2) the sleeve or spacer was 
included in the attachment of the lever, and was on the 
machine at the time of delivery. 
We return now to the facts as established by the 
testimony. 
Plaintiff's next witness was Kerry Olsen, a farmer, 
from near Eden, Utah, and himself the owner of a baler 
of the type in question which he, too, purchased in 1951 
(Tr. 23). He identified E;xhibits A, B and C as parts 
coming from his baler. The exhibits were received in 
evidence for illustrative purposes. On cross-'examina-
tion, he testified that during normal operations parts 
of the machine became loosened, and it is necessary from 
time to time to go over the machine and tighten them 
up (Tr. 24), or replace them (Tr. 27). 
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Plaintiff's next witness was plaintiff himself and 
it is necessary that his testimony be detailed. He testi-
fied on direct examination that he did custom work with 
hay baling equipment, tractors, and carry-alls, and that 
all of his time was spent working with farm and in-
dustrial equipment (Tr. 28). He bought the baler in 
September, 1951, used it to bale some 1300 bales of hay 
that fall, stored it through the winter, and had used it 
for some two weeks the next spring prior to the accident 
(Tr. 29-30). He demonstrated to the Court and jury 
the position of the lever while baling, namely, that when 
in the depressed position the end of it was at his right 
hip as he sat on the tractor seat, and that when released 
it moved upward and backward (Tr. 31-32). On the 
day in question he had completed baling one section of 
the field, had depressed the lever to take the baler out 
of operation, and moved to another section to bale some 
more. With the lever in this depressed position at his 
right hip, he turned on his seat to the right, brought his 
face over the lever, reached for the handle to release it, 
but before he touched it the lever released itself and the 
spring tension caused it to fly up and strike him in the 
face (Tr. 31-32). The handle struck him across the 
bridge of the nose, and the extreme end of the handle 
pierced his right eye (Tr. 33) (we emphasize this point 
particularly for reasons that will presently appear). 
After testifying as to the nature and extent of his 
injuries, he testified that about two weeks after the 
accident he removed the lever from the baler, and re-
moved the bolt, Exhibit E, (which when received in evi-
dence was but part of a bolt), and that there was no 
sleeve. In explaining why Exhibit E was but part of 
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a bolt, he said that in rmnoving it with wrenches he 
twisted it in two, and the nut end fell into the grass and 
he couldn't see \vell enough to find it (Tr. 45-46). He 
also testified that there were washers on the bolt when 
he removed it (Tr. 47), and at that time the lever had 
some up and down play in it. He hadn't noticed it 
before. 
On cross-examination he testified that he had owned 
balers before purchasing this one, but was in the market 
for a new one. Others had told him that the Long 50 
was a good baler, and he decided to buy one. He saw 
this one at Egan's, and arranged for it to be sent to his 
farm. He used it for two or three days and bought it 
(Tr. 52-54), despite the fact that he had concluded from 
his de1nonstration there were things wrong with it-
loose and defective parts (Tr. 58-59), although nothing 
wrong with the lever assembly that he noticed. He did 
nothing himself to correct the defects, not even to 
tighten loose bolts he knew were loose, but used it in 
that condition that fall, and the next spring up to the 
time of the accident (Tr. 59-60). Prior to the accident 
plaintiff called Egan's mechanic to come and fix a 
broken part, and while the mechanic was there plaintiff 
did not call his attention to other matters that plaintiff 
knew needed fixing err. 61-63). Also that at the time 
he bought the machine he knew the lever had too much 
play in it (Tr. 66). 
He further testified that the machine was not in 
his possession continuously prior to the accident but 
three other fellows had it and used it at different times 
(Tr. 66-67). Also that he never did like the lever assem-
bly, and had discussed with an Egan representative a 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
change in its design, because, as it \Yas, he was running 
into it every time he walked between the tractor and 
the baler (Tr. 68), and that it was in the way in getting 
on and off the seat (Tr. 71). 
He was then brought back to the occasion of his 
removal of the bolt, Exhibit E,, shortly after the accident. 
In this connection, he testified that in addition to the 
nut and bolt, there were two washers on the nut end 
of the bolt, and that in attempting to loosen the nut, 
he twisted the bolt in two. The two washers, as well 
as the nut end of the bolt dropped in the grass, and he 
couldn't find them because he "couldn't see too good"-
he still had his eye bandaged, and the other eye was 
inflamed (Tr. 75 ). 
In his further description of how the accident hap-
pened, he reiterated that the lever was at his right hip 
in a depressed position, that leaning to his right he had 
brought his face over the lever, and was looking down-
ward, when it released, the handle striking his nose, 
and the extreme end of the handle punctured his eye 
(Tr. 86-88). He denied that he was in the process of 
climbing on the tractor from the right when the accident 
happened (Tr. 86), but acknowledged, following a 
demonstration, that if he was he would then be in a 
position for the lever to strike across the bridge of his 
nose and the end to pierce his right eye (Tr. 89.} 
Next followed a demonstration in which plaintiff 
participated, and which disclosed that with the lever 
assembled without the bushing ( s01netimes referred to 
as the sleeve or spacer-Exhibit B) the lever wouldn't 
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work at all (Tr. 89-93). At this he acknowledged that 
perhaps the bushing had been there, but had become 
broken during the course of the baler's use (Tr. 9·3). , 
On redirect examination he sought to demonstrate 
that a spot of weld on the frame prevented the lever 
from working in the previous demonstration made with-
out the bushing, and showed how by using some half 
dozen additional washers (which he previously had 
testified were not on his n1achine), and a loose nut on 
the bolt, the lever could work without the bushing (Tr. 
110). However, on recrossexamination, he cinched up 
the nut (as he had previously testified that the nut 
in question was cinched so tight he broke the bolt in 
removing it) and when so tightened it was again demon-
strated that with a tight nut and no bushing the lever 
couldn't be operated at all (Tr. 111-112). 
The further testimony consisted of that of Max 
Robinson, who had used the baler but who couldn't 
recall whether it was subsequent or prior to the accident, 
and who testified that he had not adjusted any bolts 
or worked on the lever assembly (rrr. 113-114). Also 
the testimony of Evan Stark, who had used the baler, 
prior to the accident and who did not add, tighten or 
remove any bolts from the lever assembly. Dick Spur-
lock, the third man who used the baler, was not called 
as a witness, but one George Combe and one Bud Combe 
testified that during the time Spurlock was using the 
baler at their place they never saw him work on the 
lever assembly, or otherwise tighten or adjust any 
bolts. (Tr. 116-121). 
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We are mindful that the foregoing detail of the 
evidence has been somewhat lengthy, but we have 
deemed it essential that this Court be fully advised of 
the evidence before the lower Court, and on which it 
based the ruling from which this appeal is made. 
II. 
POINTS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF AND 
CONTROVERTED BY DEFENDANT. 
In seeking a reversal of the lower Court's order for 
a directed verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiff raises 
the following points: 
(A) The evidence tended to prove negligence on 
the part of defendant in assen~bling the baler, 
(B) The evidence did not prove as a matter of 
law that the accident was caused by plain-
tiff'~ negligence, nor that plaintiff's negli-
gence contributed thereto, 
(C) The evidence did not prove as a matter of 
law that plaintiff assumed the risk of his 
injuries. 
In this connection plaintiff assigns to the lower 
Court the latter ground as the basis for the lower Court's 
ruling. In so doing plaintiff is acting purely gratui-
tously, as there is nothing in the record to so indicate. 
True it is that prior to making its ruling, the Court re-
quired, and listened intently to, extensive argument by 
respective counsel on each of the points, but there is 
and was nothing to indicate that its ruling was based 
on any one of the~e points, to the exclusion of the others. 
Actually the matter is of little consequence, because, 
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regardless of what may or may not have been par..; 
ticularly pursuasive to thelower Court, the ruling should 
be sustained if right for any reason. 
We will now consider the several points raised by 
plaintiff. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DE-
FENDANT IN ASSEMBLING THE BALER 
PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURIEB. 
In considering this phase of the case, it is impor .. 
tant to bear in mind that both in the lower Court, and 
in his brief herein, plaintiff has contended that defend-
ant's negligence consisted of two acts: 
( 1) Omitting to insert the bushing (sometimes re-
ferred to as the sleeve or spacer) in attaching the lever, 
and 
(2) Using a 3j8" bolt, instead of a 1/2" bolt in 
attaching the lever. 
In discussing this point of argument plaintiff in-
accurately, as we believe, refers to defendant's actions 
in preparing the baler for delivery as "assembling the 
baler". 
Actually, the baler came completely assembled ex-
cept for the attchment of the lever. To the extent that 
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the act of so attaching the lever can be described as 
assembling it, defendant admittedly did so, but only 
to that extent. 
It is also necessary to bear in mind that proof of 
negligence on the part of defendant, standing alone, 
is not sufficient. The proof must also show that such 
negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Our 
views on both points will now be presented. 
First, the question of defendant's asserted negli-
gence. All of the affirmative evidence on the point must 
come from the testimony of Mr. Egan, and the plaintiff, 
because no one else testified in regard thereto. Mr. 
Egan's testimony established that when he received the 
baler from the distributor, the lever was detached and 
separately wrapped, but that the bolt, washers, spacer 
and nut were attached to the baler, and all that was 
necessary for him to do was to remove these parts from 
the frame, insert the lever, and fasten it with these same 
bolt, spacer, washers and nut, and this was done. He 
used no parts of his own-used only the parts supplied 
him by the distributor-and all of them. 
Thus his testimony established as a part of plain-
tiff's own case, that the bushing in question was in-
serted in the attaching process. True it is, that he was 
the President and General Manager of defendant Com-
pany, and hence plaintiff may not be bound by his 
testimony in the strict sense of the word, but his testi-
mony is, nevertheless, competent evidence of the fact, 
and, except as it may have been contradicted by sub-
sequent witnesses, constitutes the only evidence upon 
the subject. Now, where is there anything to contradict 
10 
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his testimony that the bushing was not omitted in the 
attaching process 1 We look to the testimony of the 
plaintiff himself, as he was the only witness other than 
Mr. Egan who testified on the subject. His testimony 
was that some two weeks after the accident, (approxi-
mately nine months after the purchase of the machine~ 
and after the machine had been out of his possession 
and into the possession of at least three other individ-
uals, he disassembled the lever, and no bushing was 
then present. Actually all he had of the attaching parts 
at the time of trial was the head end of a broken bolt, 
the other parts having been lost in the grass at the time 
of his taking it apart. He did not contradict Mr. Egan 
in that the bushing was there at the time of delivery, 
but on the contrary conceded that it could have become 
broken and fallen out during his operation of the baler 
during the several months preceding the accident. 
Further than that, his categorical assertion that the 
bushing was not present when he detached the lever 
loses much of its force in the light of his testimony 
that at the time he couldn't see well, his one eye was 
bandaged and the other inflamed, and that he actuall)' 
lost in the grass all of the parts that were present 
except the head end of the broken bolt. 
Further than that, it was conclusively established 
that the lever assembly operated satisfactorily at all 
times prior to the accident, and gave the plaintiff no 
trouble whatsoever; and that without the bushing, and 
with the nut cinched tight (and it was so tight plaintiff 
twisted the bolt in two in attempting to loosen the nut), 
the lever wouldn't operate at all. 
11 
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Thus, on the point of whether defendant omitted 
the bushing at the time of attaching the lever, and be-
fore delivery of the baler to plaintiff, we have the 
following: 
(1) Egan's positive testimony that it was not omit-
ted, 
(2) The lever operated satisfactorily during the 
several weeks the bailer was in operation prior to the 
accident, 
( 3) Without the bushing the lever bound against 
the frame and would not operate at all, so it must have 
been present, 
( 4) Plaintiff's admission that it might have become 
broken and fallen out, 
(5) Plaintiff's admission that he couldn't see well 
at the time he detached the lever, and 
(6) Plaintiff's admission that he lost in the grass 
at the time of removal all of the attaching parts that 
were pres·ent, except the head end of the bolt. 
, We submit, accordingly, that there was no evidence 
whatever that defendant omitted the bushing, and that 
the evidence as well as all inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, are all to the contrary. 
Now, as to the contention that an undersized bolt 
was used by defendant in attaching the lever. 
On this point the evidence disclosed that the open-
ing through the bushing was large enough to acconuno-
date a lj2" bolt, but that a 3/8" bolt was used. In the 
12 
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ii: 
~· 
first place, in characterizing it as undersized, we use 
only counsel's descriptive phraseology. True it is that 
it was an eighth of an inch smaller than the opening 
in the bushing through which it passed, but it must be 
remembered that the bushing was designed to turn on 
the bolt, and thus the bolt of necessity had to be smaller. 
Further than that, it is the bolt that was supplied by 
the manufacturer for this purpose, and it must be 
assumed, absent some pretty potent evidence to the 
contrary, that the manufacturer provided a bolt that 
was right and proper. Here it will be recalled that 
the manufacturer was named a defendant, and was 
charged with improperly designing and engineering the 
baler, but the action has not been pursued against him, 
and there is no evidence in this case to support those 
allegations. Certainly on the record as it now stands, 
the defendant cannot be charged with liability for using 
the precise part that was designed and supplied by the 
manufacturer for that particular purpose. 
Finally, assuming a larger bolt could have been 
used, there is no evidence that the smaller bolt produced 
or contributed to the injury. The baler was in oper-
ation for many weeks prior to the accident, and the 
plaintiff, as well as the others who had used it, testified 
that the lever had never slipped out before. It is in-
conceivable that if it was the small bolt that caused it 
to slip out on this occasion, the same slipping would have 
occurred at least once during the long periods of oper-
ation prior to the accident. To say that the three-eights 
inch bolt caused the accident, as distinguished from 
any one of a dozen other causes, is purely speculation. 
13 
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In support of his contention that defendant was 
negligent in using this particular bolt, despite the fact 
it was the one supplied by the manufacturer for this 
particular purpose, plaintiff cites and relies on two 
recent decisions of this court. Hooper v. General 
Motors Corp. (Utah 1953) 260 P. (2) 549, and Northern 
v. General Motors Corporation (Utah 1954) 268 P. (2) 
981. Each of those cases involved suits against the 
manufacturer of the vehicle involved, as distinguished 
from a suit against a dealer, as in the instant case. In 
each case there was affirmative evidence of a defect 
in materials used, which, as the court pointed out in 
the Northern case, is something which "in this day of 
X-ray and other elaborate methods of testing steel" 
was reasonably discoverable by a manufacturer or as-
sembler such as General Motors. 
The duty to reasonably inspect is, of course, the 
measure of a vendor's responsibility to the purchaser of 
a manufactured article, but what is reasonable for the 
manufacturer, may well be unreasonable for a mere 
vendor. The Northern case presents an apt example. 
It may well be that a manufacturer or assembler such 
as General Motors has the duty, through technical 
processes available to it, to discover defects in steel 
that go into the finished product, but it would be highly 
unreasonable to impose the same responsibility on the 
retailer. Likewise, the designer and manufacturer of 
the hay baler here involved might well be charged with 
knowledge that the use of the particular bolt might 
present a hazard, but how can Egan, who is neither 
designer, engineer nor manufacturer, be charged with 
that knowledge. The most he can do is to inspect and 
14 
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test. By inspection he is aware that the bolt in question 
is the one reconnnended by the manufacturer for the 
particular purpose, and to all outward appearances fits 
the purpose. By testing he can ascertain to some de-
gree its suitability, but the extent of the testing must 
be reasonable. In the instant case the lever assembly 
worked satisfactorily during five weeks of continuous 
field operation of the baler-two weeks in the fall 
and three weeks the following spring. Plaintiff, who 
himself operated the baler during the greater portion 
of this period, testified that at no time pr;ior to the 
accident did it operate other than satisfactorily. In 
other words, Egan could have field tested this machine 
for up to five weeks without discovering that the bolt 
was unsatisfactory. We submit that the doctrine of 
reasonable inspection does not impose this responsibility 
on a dealer such as Egan. If it did, a vendor of farm 
machinery could never sell a new machine, but of 
necessity would be required to virtually wear it out in 
tests, unless he was willing to assume the risk of a 
defect in design or manufacture. 
We have, for the purposes of demonstrating the 
particular point, assumed during the past several para-
graphs of this brief, that the bolt was in fact undersized 
and thus constituted a defect in the machine. We sub-
mit, however, that there is no evidence in the record 
to support this assu1nption. To reach this assumption 
plaintiff relies upon an answer given by Mr. Egan, 
"It wouldn't be right", to a question propounded him 
by plaintiff's counsel, and informs this court (page 11 
of plaintiff's brief) that by the answer Egan admitted 
that the use of such bolt would constitute negligence. 
15 
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We deny both the fact and the inference. The question 
that was propounded, and the answer, are as follows 
(Tr. 12): 
"Q But, getting back to my exact question, 
if someone put a 3j8 bolt through a half inch 
bushing, as this appears to be, wouldn't you say 
that that was improperly assembled~ 
"A. That wouldn't be right." 
Plaintiff pursued the matter no further, being con-
tent with this somewhat ambiguous answer. What 
"wouldn't be right"~ Obviously what Egan is saying is 
that the assumption plaintiff's counsel indulged in fram-
ing the question, namely, that such use constituted im-
proper assembly, wasn't right. Certainly it is a far 
cry from any admission on his part that the use of the 
bolt in question wasn't right, much less negligence. 
Plaintiff also complains (page 12 of his brief) that 
had the trial progressed in its "logical order" he would 
"have brought out evidence that Egan Farm 
Service, Inc., improperly assembled the lever 
mechanism on nearly every long "50" baler which 
it sold and assembled to the minimum point of 
showing that 3/8 inch bolts were inserted into 
1j2 inch bushin.gs (Tr. 12, 22, 24); and that this 
defect could have been remedied by drilling the 
baler chamber to 1j2 inch in size and inserting a 
1j2 inch bolt." 
What he means by had "the trial progressed in its 
logical order" he would have brought out this evidence, 
we are at a loss to understand. The trial proceeded to 
a point where he rested, and, if in resting, he deprived 
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himself of the opportunity of offering additional evi-
dence, he alone is to blame. Further than that, the 
significance of this additional evidence from plaintiff's 
standpoint is not apparent. What he is suggesting is 
that this same so-called "undersized bolt" was used by 
Egan in all of the Long 50 balers he sold. But plaintiff 
doesn't claim that any other purchaser had any trouble 
as a result thereof, which reacts against his contention 
that the bolt was responsible for his difficulty. Actually, 
plaintiff was induced in part to buy a Long 50 upon the 
recommendation of other owners (Tr. 52), and if their 
balers had the same type bolt, it would be but further 
evidence that the same was both proper and suitable. 
Further than that, plaintiff would have proved 
that "the defect could have been remedied by drilling 
the baler chamber to lj2 inch in size and inserting a 
1/2 inch bolt." In other words, to cure the "defect" 
defendant would have had to enlarge the baler chamber 
to accommodate a larger bolt. This but emphasizes 
what we have been arguing, namely, that the dostrine of 
reasonable care does not impose upon a dealer in nat-
ionally advertised and widely used farm machinery the 
duty of redesigning and rebuilding machines supplied 
him by the manufacturer before he can safely offer them 
to his customers. 
B. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURIES WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED AND 
CONTRIBUTED TO BY HIS OWN NEGLI-
GE1NCE. 
17 
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Assuming for this phase of the argument that 
negligence on the part of the defendant was present, 
we contend that plaintiff was himself negligent, and 
such negligence proximately caused, or contributed to 
his injuries. We make this contention by reason of 
plaintiff's own testimony that he (1) knew of the haz-
ard presented by the lever while in the depressed con-
dition under spring tension, (2) that it was unnecessary 
for him to bring his face over the lever in order to 
release it, and (3) that he needlessly exposed himself to 
this danger. We quote from his testimony on this point 
( Tr. 83-85) : 
"Q Now assuming that the chair upon which 
you are now sitting is the tractor seat, can you 
indicate for the benefit of the Court and the 
jury approximately where the handle of the lever 
would be? 
"A Well, you could reach the handle of the 
lever back with your right hand from the tractor 
seat. 
"Q Now you are indicating a point immedi-
ately opposite your right hip, are you not? 
"A That's right. 
"Q As you sit there 
"A That's right. 
"Q And approximately how far distant from 
your hip? 
"A Well, there is about 18 inches of space 
between the tractor seat and the fender, and the 
lever would center in this position. (Indicating) 
"Q So the lever would be approximately 9 
inches from your hip, you think 1 
18 
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"A That would be about right. 
"Q And up even with your hip¥ 
"A Somewhere close. 
"Q Now you further testified that you had 
had occasion to set and release that lever many 
times in the past? 
"A Every time I took the machine out of 
operation. 
"Q In fact you had set the lever in that 
position just a few minutes before the injury 
had occurred, had you not¥ 
"A That's right. 
"Q The lever, in this set or depressed po-
sition, is pulling against the tension of a spring 
to which it is attached, is it not¥ 
"A It is. 
"Q And you knew that at that time¥ 
"A Yes. 
"Q And you knew by reason of that tension, 
that upon its being released it releases with con-
siderable force¥ 
"A Yes. 
"Q Now at this particular moment, as I re-
call your testimony, you were just getting ready 
to release the lever to commence baling this 
second section~ 
"A I had pulled in and stopped, and was 
getting ready to start on this next field of hay. 
"Q And I believe you testified that you were 
just in the act of reaching for the lever 1 
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"A For some reason I turned around on the 
seat of the tractor. 
"Q I realize that, but didn't you say you 
were just getting ready to release the lever~ 
"A I was in the process of beginning to bale. 
"Q Let's see if we can be a little more defi-
nite than that. Didn't you say that you were 
just reaching for the lever at the time it released 
unexpectedly upon you~ 
"A I may have said that. 
"Q This was in the afternoon~ 
"A Yes. I think it was right after lunch. 
"Q You could see well at that time, could 
you not~ 
"A Yes. 
"Q Was there anything that distracted your 
attention at that particular moment from what 
you were doing~ 
"A Nothing that I know of, other than get-
ting ready to start on the field. 
"Q Now the lever, in the position that it was 
in, could be released without your bringing your 
face over it, could it not~ 
"A Yes, it could be released. 
"Q But nevertheless, as I understand it, you 
did bring your face over the lever~ 
"A Well, I was in a position for it to strike 
me. That's true. 
"Q And in that position you had brought 
your face over the lever~ 
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"A That's right. 
"Q And the lever, upon being released, came 
up and hit you in the face~ 
"A That's right. 
Plaintiff, however, argues that contributory negli-
gence is applicable only where the party has exposed 
himself to the particular risk from which he suffers 
harm, and that in the instant case the particular risk 
was not the lever held under spring tension, but the 
allegedly defective catch which held it in place. We 
submit such is not the case. An analagous situation 
existed in the case of Raymond v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
113 Utah 26, 191 P. (2) 137. In that case plaintiff, 
who had had many years' experience in railroading, 
was on the end of an open gondola car during switch-
ing operations, his hand grasping the top of the car 
and his fingers on the inside. The car was loaded with 
scrap metal, a portion of which shifted and crushed his 
hand. He acknowledged that it was unnecessary for him 
to have his hand inside the car, as there was an available 
grab bar he could have been holding onto. The lower 
court held him guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law, and this court affirmed. On this parti-
cular point the court observed: 
"Notwithstanding his extensive railroad ex-
perience, and his cognizance of the dangers of 
shifting loads he placed his hand in a position on 
and inside the car in such a manner that a slight 
forward shifting of the load could and did injure 
it. 
"On cross-examination plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
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" 'Q. You knew it was extremely dangerous 
to put your hand in such a position on the top 
of that gondola; you knew that it was dangerous 
to, and unsafe thing to do, didn't you, Mr. Ray-
mond, to place your hand on the end of that 
gondola so that * * * A. Yes. 
" 'Q. If some of the load shifted you might 
get injured; you knew that~ A. I wasn't ex-
pecting the load to shift. 
" 'Q. Of course not. You wouldn't deliber-
ately put your hand there~ A. No. 
"'Q. But you knew it was dangerous to put 
any part of your body inside of a loaded gondola 
when it is in movement, didn't you? A. It is. 
"On redirect examination plaintiff was led 
by his counsel into stating that what he meant 
by his testimony on cross-examination was that 
it was unsafe under the circumstances to put his 
hand inside the car, but that if the load had been 
tied down securely, it would not have been unsafe. 
The explanation offered by plaintiff on redirect 
examination can hardly be regarded as a satis-
factory explanation of his cross-examination. 
" * * * * 
"The obvious truth, from plaintiff's own 
testimony, is that he gave no thought to his own 
safety. He placed his hand in a position which 
he knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe 
method open to him. The court below correctly 
held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law." 
The same is true here. Plaintiff had no thought 
of his own saftey. He placed his face in a position he 
knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe method 
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ili 
open to hi1n. We submit that under the circumstances 
the plaintiff herein, like the plaintiff in the case just 
cited, was himself, by his own testimony, negligent as 
a matter .of law. 
c. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF ASSUMED 
THE RISK OF HIS INJURIES. 
Here again we assume for the purpose of the argu-
ment that defendant was negligent, but urge that even 
upon that assumption the plaintiff cannot recover for 
the reason that he assumed the risk of his injuries. Two 
comparatively recent cases involving the doctrine of 
assumed risk as it is applied in this jurisdiction are 
Clay v. Dunford (Utah) 1952, 239 P. (2) 1075, and Wold 
v. Ogden City (Utah, 1953), 258 P. (2) 453. 
The Clay case involved a situation where the plain-
tiff stepped from his parked station wagon into the 
path of a moving vehicle. The doctrine was held not 
there applicable because at the time plaintiff was struck 
he was 
"standing on the shoulder of the highway where 
vehicles ordinarily do not travel, with his back 
turned toward the oncoming truck, completely 
negativing knowledge or appreciation of the 
specific danger, and negativing any intention 
voluntarily to expose himself to a known danger, 
* * * " 
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Wolfe pointed 
out that ·for the doctrine to be applicable it must be 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shown that there is: (1) a palpably dang~rous condition; 
(2) knowledge and appreciation of the danger; and (3) 
a voluntary act by plaintiff showing that he was willing 
to take the chance. 
We submit that each condition was present in the 
instant case. The depressed lever held under spring 
tension constituted a palpably dangerous condition; 
plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware of the danger 
-but din't think the catch would let go; he voluntarily 
and deliberately exposed himself to the danger, ad-
mitting that it was unnecessary for him to do so. The 
fact he didnt think the catch would let go does not obviate 
his awareness of the danger. The situation is analogous 
to the workman who put his hand in the open gondola 
car (Raymond v. Union Pacific, supra) "not expecting 
the load to shift". Or like an individual who knowingly 
and deliberately looks into the muzzle of a gun he knows 
to be loaded and on cock. Certainly he doesn't expect 
that the catch which holds the gun on cock is defective, 
or that it will slip and permit the gun to discharge, but 
when he knowingly and needlessly brings any part o±' 
his body into range under those circumstances he as-
sumes the risk of any consequences, as well as being 
contributorily negligent. 
True it is that a piece of farm machinery such as 
this is not an instrument inherently dangerous in and of 
itself, but there are moving parts thereof, gears and 
pulleys as well as spring tension levers, which present a 
hazard. Likewise, the engine on the baler being in 
operation, a vibration is created which will have a 
tendency to dislodge the catch on a spring tension lever 
where the same is not firmly set, or where the locking 
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parts have become worn through usage. These are facts 
which are well knov.m to any reasonably prudent man, 
more especially to one who has worked about farm 
machinery generally to the extent plaintiff had. Thus, 
we submit that the plaintiff, being fully aware of the 
potential danger, but nevertheless deliberately and need-
lessly exposing himself thereto, brought himself within 
the doctrine of assu1ned risk. 
We have also 1nentioned the case of Wold v. Ogden 
City, supra. This case involved an open trench ex-
tending along the Northerly side of 18th Street, between 
Washington and Grant Avenues, in Ogden City. Plain-
tiff resided on the North side of 18th Street, about mid-
way of the block. Plaintiff was aware of the open 
trench. About 2 :30 A.M., he was returning home with 
his wife "looked the situation over", "decided he could 
safely cross", straddled the ditch to assist his wife 
across, and fell into the trench when one of the banks 
gave way under his foot. There were no crossings over 
the trench, and persons living on the North side of 18th 
Street either had to jump the trench, or go to Grant 
A venue or Washington Avenue and cross in the street. 
This Court held: 
"Under such facts we believe plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent and also assumed a known 
risk precluding recovery as a matter of law, 
denying no constitutional right to a jury trial." 
1entl Those facts are analogous to those in the instant 
l~~ case. In each case the plaintiff was aware of the hazard 
~v~i -the open ditch in the Wold case, and the lever under 
~~~ spring tension in this case. In each case a safe way 
~ 
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of proceeding was provided-by going around the trench 
in the Wold case, and by operating the lever without 
exposing his head to its line of travel in this case. In 
neither case did the plaintiff forsee the specific oc-
currence which resulted in his injuries-the bank giving 
way in the Wold case, or the catch giving way in this 
case. This Court held he was contributorily negligent 
and assumed the risk in the Wold case. We respectfully 
submit that the same conclusion must of necessity follow 
here. As pointed out in the Wold case: 
"the doctrine of assumption of risk, originally 
applicable to employer-en1ployee relations, has 
been extended to some situations where one knows 
of a condition and concludes to accept its attend-
ant hazards and acts accordingly without force 
of necessity." 
CONCLUSION. 
Defendant submits that the lower court had a duty 
as a matter of law, under the evidence as it stood at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs case, to direct a verdict in 
favor of the defendant, upon each of the grounds as-
signed, namely, (1) no negligence shown on the part 
of the defendant; (2) contributory negligence on the 
part of plaintiff; and ( 3) assumption of risk on the 
part of plaintiff. 
In regard to defendant's negligence, which plaintiff 
contends consisted of (1) omitting the bushing, and (2) 
using an undersized bolt, the evidence consisted of: 
.A. AS TO THE BUSHNG. 
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1. Egan's positive testimony that it was not 
omitted, which testimony was not contradic-
ted, directly, indirectly or inferentially, 
2. The lever operated satisfactorily during the 
several weeks of operation prior to the 
accident, 
3. Without the bushing and with the bolt 
cinched tight (as it admittedly was) the lever 
wouldn't operate at all, 
4. Plaintiff's concession that it might have be-
come broken and fallen out, 
5. Plaintiff's admission that he couldn't see 
well at the tin1e he detached the lever, and, 
6. Plaintiff's admission that he lost in the grass 
all of the attaching parts that were present 
except the head end of the bolt. 
Thus, under the evidence on this point there was 
not even a scintilla of evidence that the bushing had 
been omitted by Egan-nothing whatever that could 
support a finding by the jury that it had been omitted. 
B. AS TO THE BOLT. 
1. There was no evidence whatever that the 
bolt was undersized, except in the sense that 
it was of slightly less diameter than the 
bushing through which it passed, whic;h is 
normal. 
2. It was the bolt that was supplied by the 
manufacturer for this particular purpose. 
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3. There was no evidence whatever that the 
size of the bolt proximately caused the catch 
to give way, and it would be pure speculation 
to say that such was the cause. 
We submit that the status of the evidence as above 
referred to upon the question of the defendant's negli-
gence supports as a matter of law the ruling of the 
lower court granting a directed verdict, without regard 
to the questions of contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk. Notwithstanding that, however, plaintiff's 
own evidence established as a matter of law that he was 
guilty of contributory negligence in needlessly exposing 
himself to the hazards of the known danger, and that 
in so doing he assurned the risk of the resulting con-
sequences. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL~, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
RICHARD W. BRANN 
Attorneys for defendant and 
respondent. 
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